Archives

Dr. Gayane Novikova

April 20, 2020

A Few Preliminary Remarks

The Declaration of Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) mentions as main goals “strengthening mutual trust, friendship and good neighborliness between the member states; encouraging effective cooperation between them in the political, trade, economic, scientific, technical, cultural, educational, energy, transport, environmental and other fields; making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in the region and establishing new, democratic, just and rational international political and economic order.” This analysis will concentrate on some issues related to the maintenance of security and stability. Before analyzing the potential of the SCO, a few preliminary remarks are necessary.  See more …

Dr. Gayane Novikova

February 12, 2020

Recent developments in Eurasia and the Middle East require a re-evaluation of the security environment and the roles of each regional and sub-regional actor. Against the background of trends in global security politics, Russia and Turkey have become key actors in the Wider Black Sea and the South Caucasus regions, as well as in Syria.

The fight against terrorism (remains of ISIS, in particular) constitutes the only issue where Russian, Turkish, and Armenian interests coincide.  In all other cases, especially regarding any possible developments in the Nagorniy Karabakh conflict, Armenia should be very cautious in evaluating any shift in Russia-Turkey bilateral relations. The Armenian government is working on a new National Security Strategy that hopefully will address current dangerous trends. A draft was discussed in November, 2019. See more …

Dr. Gayane Novikova
October 25, 2019
In the context of a broad security analysis it is necessary to bring into focus the regional geopolitical environment. It critically – and increasingly – influences developments in and around every regional state. Meanwhile, a fragile regional security per se can greatly contribute to the escalation of existing local conflicts and even transform some of them into regional ones. The global security deficit is increasing.   Armenia’s geopolitical location – at the core of an area that includes the South Caucasus, Russia, Turkey, and Iran – is very challenging. A hostile US – Russia relationship, growing disagreements between the US and Turkey, a new cycle of dangerous escalation of tension between the US and Iran, some improvement in Turkish-Iranian bilateral relations and the deepening ties of both states with Russia, – all these trends directly influence and shape the trajectory of Armenian foreign and security policy. Negative and / or unexpected developments in the wider region will seriously threaten Armenia’s security. To survive “a battle” between the global and regional actors it needs to demonstrate and to implement maximum flexibility and manoeuvrability. Armenia’s strategic location contains, alongside serious limitations, also some advantages. Therefore, geopolitics matters …again. See more

Dr. Gayane Novikova

October 11, 2019

I have never considered myself as a person who can contribute to the discussion on energy, ecology, mining, and other similar issues. However, almost always there is a direct and strong connection between energy/ ecology issues and the ruling elites on the one hand, and the complex dynamic between the ruling elite and the opposition, on the other.  And because this theme is closer to my interests, I gladly answered Margarita’s suggestion to add another dimension to today’s discussion.

Since 1988, Armenia has had several waves of ecology-based movements, which — to different degree  — have been challenging for the ruling elite, The current circle is related to the controversial developments around an exploitation of the Amulsar Gold Mine (the term of operation is 10 years; according to evaluations, it has 73 tons of gold and 294 tons of silver). However, there are significant differences between the earlier cases and the one now in progress.

A few preliminary remarks:

• Armenia has very limited natural resources, nonetheless, its soil is rich in iron, copper, molybdenum, lead, zinc, gold, silver, antimony, aluminum.
• According to the Armenian Development Agency, more than 670 mines of solid minerals, including 30 metal mines, with confirmed resources, are currently registered in the state inventory of mineral resources. Among these around 400 mines, including 22 metal mines, are under operation. Among metal minerals there are 7 copper-molybdenum mines, 4 copper mines, 14 gold and gold-polymetallic mines, 2 polymetallic mines, 2 iron ore mines and 1 aluminum mine.
• Just to give you an idea of the scope of the developments in the mining sector, let me mention that in 2005, 17 mining and metallurgical enterprises were in operation; the largest enterprises mined copper and molybdenum ore or extracted gold from tailings. Ore concentrates and metals are the state’s most important export products (the first is a diamond cutting industry that is based on imported raw materials from Russia).
• Therefore, Armenia’s mining sector is a key contributor to the national economy. This means that any Armenian government is eager to keep it operating and, probably, even to enlarge it.  In the meantime:

a) The mining (together with the construction industry) was and is a great source of corruption. All previous Armenian governments were selling the mines to international (mainly, offshore) companies and were taking all necessary steps to hide the actual ownership — quite often the owners of the mines were family members of representatives of the ruling elite. (Kocharyan court case — corruption /bribe $3 million)

b) The mining industry is extremely dangerous for health. In the areas of intensive mining the population is suffering from lung diseases, and different types of cancer and allergies.

c) Another negative factor is a stage of ecology: Armenia faces the direct danger of complete deforestation and growing desertification.

d) There are serious concerns about the water level and water condition in lake Sevan, and several rivers.

All of these listed factors are urgent issues for the current ruling elite, that — factually — cannot address them without putting into question its legitimacy.

The Pashinyan team came to power as a result of multiple actions of civil disobedience and non-violent resistance in April-May, 2018. The snap parliamentary elections in December 2018, confirmed a high level of legitimacy of Pashinyan and his party, “My step”: the party holds 88 out of 132 mandates. The second in the Parliament is the Prosperous Armenia Party (with 26 MPs, which since the beginning of its establishment in 2004 was almost always pro-governmental).  The smallest faction in the Parliament is Bright Armenia (17 mandates, not much power, but on certain occasions its members can demonstrate their strong disagreement with the ruling party’s activity). One MP presents himself as an independent.

The current structure of the parliament allows the ruling elite to ignore suggestions, proposals, complaints, and demands of the parliamentary opposition. Moreover, the modus operandi of the ruling elite in general is clear: the incumbent  prime minister has strong mass support, and when (or if) something critical happens, the ruling party immediately appeals for popular support via rallies, the blocking of streets, etc.

However, owing to:

• Pashinyan’s personal ambitions and populist behavior, his willingness and intension to be personally in charge — for everything!;
• a lack of a strategic long-term vision;
• the slow crystallization of a growing resistance BY  of a non-parliamentary opposition, which has still some public support;
• a, finally, growing disappointment among certain strata of the Pashinyan supporters, mainly because of the government’s overstating expectations and promises,  —

any type of problematic issues can provoke a new wave of disobedience, this time — against the democratically elected government.

Now about the developments around the Amulsar Gold Mine. In addition to all above-mentioned factors, there is also a serious legal issue. The owner of the mine is Lydian Armenia, a daughter company of Lydian International, a British-American company established only because of Amulsar, and registered in Canada. The construction of its infrastructure started in August 2016, and was forcibly stopped by the local population in June 2018.

Some legal experts speculate that if this case proceeds to international arbitration, under the Investor-state Dispute Settlement (ISDS), Lydian International LTD could seek over $1 billion (some are mentioning $2 billion) in compensation from the Republic of Armenia, in order to recuperate its investment and lost potential earnings. This is a huge amount of money for the state, which has a GDP of around $12 billion. The experts also have mentioned that the ISDS mainly takes the side of the company, not the government.

Let us analyze, how the Amulsar case can influence post-Velvet revolution Armenia and where potential hidden threats and challenges lie.

First, the Armenian government — to successfully implement its promises, especially those in the social sphere, — needs a stable monetary flow; therefore it cannot ignore mining.

This means,

a) that actions of civil disobedience will continue, and probably will become broader through an involvement of those parts of the population who live near mines and are affected directly by the aftermath of mining. In particular, the population of the Vayots Dzor province (where the Amulsar is located) have been blocking the roads toward this ore deposit area since late June 2018.

b) the government puts at risk its legitimacy in case if its conflicts with certain segments of the population continue, and it will try to avoid a proper response. or just to ignore it. The worst case scenario will include an involvement of the police (until now, there have been only a few minor episodes).

Second, the government cannot ignore the consequences of a possible lawsuit, which

a) will cost a fortune, and there is no guarantee that the Armenian government will win in court; and

b) the lawsuit can damage an image of the New Armenia (this argument seems very important for the authorities) and put at risk the promised economic revolution. As Pashinyan stated: “We cannot afford to appear like a country which doesn’t respect contractual obligations.”

Third, the government has acknowledged that the ecological situation in Armenia is troubling. To address the concerns of the population, especially regarding the Amulsar, it ordered an independent risk assessment. The evaluation was provided by a Lebanese company Earth Link & Advanced Resources Development (ELARD). ELARD concluded that, according to the presented documents, the risks are low and can be fully controlled. However, the most important is that its conclusions were made without any field work. However, this conclusion allowed Prime Minister Pashinyan to make the following statement: “I am 99% sure that there is no risk for the ecology of the Republic of Armenia.” “If we see risks, we will tell to Lydian Armenia and will give it 30 days to fix the problems; otherwise we will close the mine.”

The International Federation of Human Rights (Paris) provided its concerns regarding the risks to the people and environment, measuring them as high.

Fourth: and here is the most intriguing part of this story:

According to several sources, going back to the late Soviet times, the Amulsar area is rich in Uranium and Thorium (195 tons). Therefore, Lidyan International needs to apply to the Armenian government to obtain special permission for the development of Uranium ore. As for now, neither the Armenian government nor Lydian International have mentioned a Uranium factor. However, some reliable Russian resources are talking. And I remember talks in Armenia in the mid-80s about large Uranium deposits.

And finally: the question to be answered is:

• Whether the current Armenian government will thoughtfully consider all pro and contras of this case

a) will move forward with a reopening of construction in April, 2020, and then support mining activity in Amulsar, or

b) it will seek popular support, will mobilize the population, and will try to convince the international community that the continued mine operation will be devastating to my small country.

Unfortunately, I don’t have an answer.

———————————————————————————

VALDAY TO WATCH https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=juXelPWcT2M

Dr. Gayane Novikova
April 28, 2018

A few introductory remarks

Russia’s involvement in the Nagorniy Karabakh (NK) conflict dates back to the very last years of the Soviet Union, when this conflict erupted on the territory of then-Soviet Azerbaijan. The central authorities of the Soviet Union were unable and unwilling to prevent its transformation into an overt military conflict between the Azerbaijani authorities and the ethnic Armenians, living in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of Soviet Azerbaijan. Soviet Armenia became an indirect party to this conflict, providing full support to its fellow Armenians. A proclamation of independence by Armenia, Nagorniy Karabakh, and Azerbaijan in the autumn of 1991, and the following three-year war, transformed this conflict into an international one. As a strategic ally of Armenia, a strategic partner of Azerbaijan, and co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, Russia has become (and it has been viewed as) the most active external actor in the NK conflict settlement process.

However, these three dimensions — combined with various geopolitical challenges — significantly complicate Russia’s interaction with the direct parties to the NK conflict. Russia tries to preserve political and military balances between Armenia and Azerbaijan, to prevent a new full-scale war between these two states, to avoid its own direct military participation in the conflict, and to continue cooperation with the US and France (that represents also the EU) within the format of the OSCE MG. Any miscalculation can cause a significant diminution of its role in Eurasia; Russia also cannot endanger its national security by taking sides or obviously shifting its position regarding the settlement of this conflict.

See more at:  www.academia.edu

 

International Conference
March 20-21, 2014, Yerevan, Armenia
See in more details here

March 20, 2014

An Opening Address of Dr. Gayane Novikova at the international conference «NATO’s Partnerships and the South Caucasus: A Strategic Approach to Regional Security»

Dear Mr. Secretary of the National Security Council,

Mr. William Lahue, Ambassadors Samvel Mkrtchian, and Katherine Leach,

Excellencies,

Dear Colleagues and Friends,

In my capacity as the Funding Director of the Center for Strategic Analysis, I have the honor and pleasure to welcome you to our conference.

Today’s conference which has received generous support from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,  is the logical continuation of earlier discussions held by our Center on critical developments in the South Caucasus and beyond. Before introducing our distinguished guests, I would like to emphasize, that the security system of the South Caucasus has changed significantly over the last six years. Let me identify seven causes which are apparent.

First, a different status of the South Caucasus state entities in the international security environment contributes to  simmering internal tensions in our region.

Second, the instability across the perimeters of the Middle East, which was provoked by the Arab awakening, directly and negatively influences developments in the South Caucasus.

Third, the Western European states and the USA are exhibiting a decreasing interest in the South Caucasus, and consequently this region is increasingly handed over to Eastern European surveillance.

Fourth, Russia is making serious efforts to integrate the region into its global economic and security projects. Let me mention, that the unsuccessful attempts to «reset» the US-Russia relations and the current developments in Ukraine tremendously complicate multilateral and bilateral relations throughout Eurasia, including those in the South Caucasus. All of us are watching carefully developments in and around Ukraine and  are aware of some parallels with developments in the South Caucasus in the early 90s, and in the late 2000s.

Fifth, Turkey is turning more toward the Middle East. Although its involvement in developments in the South Caucasus is secondary among its foreign policy priorities, Turkey is increasingly concerned to maintain stability in this area. In the meantime, it is entering a period of internal unrest, and this influences its role as a regional power.

Sixth, Iran is trying to restore its distinguished role in the world affairs making significant efforts to become more open to the world.

The next — and final in this range of causes — is a trend, which related to the participation of sovereign states in international organizations, should also be mentioned. The Third Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius in November, 2013, was a watershed in respect to the EU Associated Agreements with the Eastern partners. The division lines between the South Caucasus states are becoming deeper; their interaction with each other in the political, economic, and civic spheres are becoming more complicated.

Furthermore, in comparison to the previous six years, internal developments now in each state and state entity of the South Caucasus increasingly impact the joint — regional — security system. The overlapping of internal and external processes influences the dynamic of the region’s security in ambiguous and to some extend unpredictable ways.

Although against the background of growing insecurity throughout the broader region, the South Caucasus can be considered as an area of relative tranquility, peace and stability in this area are illusive.  It is crucial for all three states in the region — Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia — to avoid involvement in any intra-regional or interregional conflict. It is also critical that efforts be undertaken to create a framework for cooperation, at least in the soft security field.

Let me mention briefly that the people who are gathered around this table are internationally recognized professionals in regional security. I do believe that the presentations of the panelists, the exchange of thoughts, and roundtable discussions and brainstorming will contribute significantly to the better understanding of the security environment in our region, and will generate new ideas regarding its improvement.  I am looking forward for open, interesting, and provocative discussions.

For more information see conference’s page.